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Islamist militant organizations appear to be evolving from traditional 
disassociated networks, al-Qaeda’s model, into centralized regional powers with the 
intent of developing into national governments. This thesis presents a comparative case 
study of five mainstream Islamist militant organizations, the Islamic State, Jabhat Fatah 
al-Sham, al-Shabaab, the Afghan Taliban, and Hezbollah, to determine how close they 
have come to statehood and how such a change may affect U.S. homeland security. The 
criteria used to analyze the case studies were primarily derived from the Montevideo 
Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, which describes a state as an entity with a 
permanent population, defined borders, an ability to conduct governance, and an ability 
to enter into relations with other national governments. Additional criteria were used to 
determine the organizations’ propensity to threaten the United States in their 
governmental capacity. This thesis found that none of the Islamist militant organizations 
in the case studies currently fit all the criteria for statehood; however, none fit al-Qaeda’s 
disassociated model either. Therefore, the international community should consider 
defining and more accurately classifying these groups as militant states.  
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In the early 21st century, Islamist militant organizations are abandoning al-
Qaeda’s organizational model of disassociated networks operating around the world and 
turning toward a centralized regional-power approach. The intent of these organizations 
appears to be to build national governments that function under their interpretation of 
Islam and Sharia law. A comparative case study of five prominent organizations was 
conducted to measure the progress made toward statehood as defined by the Montevideo 
Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, which claims that states should have:  
• A permanent population 
• Defined Borders 
• Established governance 
• The capacity to enter into relations with foreign governments1 
The organizations in this study included the Islamic State, Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, al-
Shabaab, Hezbollah, and the Afghan Taliban.   
The Islamic State has met two out of the four criteria set forth by the Montevideo 
Convention. It has established governance and instituted Sharia law over a permanent 
population of Syrian and Iraqi civilians as well as numerous foreign fighters who have 
come from abroad. Although it has been claimed that the Islamic State has made oil deals 
with both the Turkish and Syrian governments, evidence remains uncertain. While the 
Islamic State controls significant portions of territory in both Syria and Iraq, its borders 
are fluid and have been defined by neither time nor politics. 
Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, al-Qaeda’s former Syrian affiliate, has also met two out of 
the four Montevideo criteria; it has also established governance over Syrian citizens who 
inhabit territory under its control. JFS has neither defined borders nor relations with 
foreign governments.  
                                                 
1 “Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States,” Council on Foreign Relations, 
accessed September 14, 2015, http://www.cfr.org/sovereignty/montevideo-convention-rights-duties-states/
p15897. 
 xvi 
Hailing from Somalia, Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahidin, or al-Shabaab, has 
fulfilled two out of the four criteria set forth by the Montevideo Convention. In the early 
2000s, al-Shabaab took control over much of southern Somalia, including portions of the 
nation’s capital, Mogadishu. Despite its initial success, the African Union prevented its 
efforts to establish Somalia as an Islamic emirate. Within the small portions of territory it 
still controls, al-Shabaab has instilled governance under Sharia law over the local 
permanent population. However, the organization’s span of control does not have defined 
borders, and the organization has not demonstrated an ability to officially enter into 
relations with foreign nations. 
Hezbollah’s use of suicide terrorism in the 1980s elevated the organization’s 
infamy among the international community. It has technically fulfilled three out of the 
four criteria in the Montevideo Convention, though this is debatable; the argument could 
be made that it has fulfilled all four criteria. Hezbollah has long controlled much of 
Southern Lebanon, where it originated. In 2016, Hezbollah established itself as a 
legitimate political party. While the region directly controlled by Hezbollah does not 
have defined borders, the organization’s participation in the Lebanese political system 
lends credence to the argument that Hezbollah’s borders are those of Lebanon. Hezbollah 
has long maintained relations with both the Syrian and Iranian governments. 
The Afghan Taliban is the only organization among the case studies that has at 
one time fulfilled all of the Montevideo Convention’s criteria for statehood. Before being 
ousted by the United States during Operation Enduring Freedom, the Taliban established 
itself as Afghanistan’s recognized national government. This means that the Taliban was 
able to establish governance over the population of Afghanistan, and the territory it 
controlled was limited to the borders of Afghanistan. The Taliban established official 
relations with Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and other Middle Eastern nations. In the years 
since the drawdown of Operation Enduring Freedom, the Taliban has seen resurgence 
and continues to regain power within Afghanistan. 
Ideological analysis of the case studies indicates an apocalyptic slant to those of 
Sunni groups like the Islamic State, Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, and al-Shabaab that maintain a 
belief that a global Islamic caliphate will rise and bring an end to all other religions. 
 xvii 
The five case study organizations do not fit all the criteria for statehood; however, 
they do not exactly fit the traditional definition of terrorist groups, either. This could 
affect U.S. homeland security in the future as current counter-terrorism policy, which 
clings to antiquated definitions of terrorist organizations, becomes ineffective at 
countering these groups. Therefore, the United States should identify a third classification 
to categorize these hybrid terrorist–government groups as militant states. This new 
classification will allow U.S. decision-makers to write policies tailored to these groups, 
which have made current counter-terrorism policy obsolete.   
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This thesis is aimed to explicitly address the following question: To what extent 
have modern Islamist terrorist organizations evolved to resemble political entities, and 
what is the associated impact on homeland and national security policies? 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Many would argue that during the early 21st century, Islamist militant 
organizations have experienced an “evolutionary shift.” Some of these organizations have 
begun to seize and hold land in an attempt to establish governance through Sharia law.1 
There are many examples of this phenomenon. In Afghanistan, for instance, a force of 
religious students (talibs) became politically known as the Taliban and then as the official 
national government of Afghanistan for several years (1994–2001).   
Other examples of this evolutionary shift have been demonstrated by a 
disenfranchised split-off group of Somali militants—al-Shabaab—that nearly conquered 
Somalia by seizing large areas of the country and imposing Sharia law on the population. 
Hezbollah in Lebanon is yet another example. Hezbollah started as an anti-Israeli militant 
organization and has now risen to the status of a legitimate political party in Lebanon. In 
Syria, the former al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat Fatah al-Sham is trying to overthrow the 
Syrian government and turn the nation into an emirate of al-Qaeda’s proposed global 
Islamic caliphate. Finally, and possibly most importantly from as U.S. policy perspective, 
the Islamic State, a burgeoning militant force, has declared itself an Islamic caliphate in 
the Middle East. The Islamic State’s plan is not limited to Iraq and Syria; its proposed 
five-year plan is to expand its borders to all regions formerly under the caliphate of the 
golden age of Islam and beyond.2   
                                                 
1 Ryan Lucas, “Al-Qaeda Splinter Group Declares Captured Territory in Syria, Iraq New Islamic 
State,” Dallas Morning News, June 29, 2014, http://www.dallasnews.com/news/local-news/20140629-al-
qaeda-splinter-group-declares-captured-territory-in-syria-iraq-new-islamic-state.ece. 




This thesis assesses the evolutionary steps being taken by the Islamic State, al-
Shabaab, Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, Hezbollah, and the Afghan Taliban.3 This study is 
intended to provide a greater understanding of how to counter the threat these groups 
pose. 
Furthermore, analyzing these groups provides information that is crucial to detect 
potential changes in the threat environment caused by this evolutionary shift. An 
ancillary intent of this thesis is to change standing perceptions of Islamist militant 
organizations. This thesis identifies the specific ways in which Islamist militant groups 
have changed, from the al-Qaeda model of disparate cells working independently toward 
a common goal around the world, into centralized regional powers that appear as national 
governments. If this shift is happening, the West’s counter-terrorism strategy may soon 
become obsolete. A key assumption of this thesis is that a new counter-terrorism policy 
may be required to adequately fit the new hybrid militant group/state governments. A 
central methodological assumption is that such a study benefits from a systematic 
comparative case study analysis Islamist terrorist organizations’ nation-building efforts. It 
is further assumed that such an approach has important implications for how the United 
States can effectively counter these organizations.  
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The research question has two key methodological implications. First, in order to 
provide analysis, it is important to assess how terrorism is adapting and evolving. Doing 
so requires identifying concrete historical examples concerning such evolution. Second, 
primary source materials, such as Dabiq magazine, Inspire magazine, and other 
propagandist materials, provide evidence of the evolution and adaptation of terrorism and 
terrorists. The literature surrounding the history and evolution of terrorism appears at first 
expansive and diverse. The following literature review encompasses studies primarily of 
                                                 
3 Hezbollah is the only case study within this project that follows Shiite ideology. Because of this, a 
note must be made to address the differences in these groups as they pertain to this study. This thesis 
primarily examines data pertaining to the actions of terrorist organizations as they relate to “nation 
building” or seeking the establishment of official governance over a group of people in a specified 
geographic region. There is therefore no reason why the Sunni/Shia ideological differences should become 
a problem for this research. The differences in Sunni and Shia Islam, while stark, do not affect the research 
or thesis as a whole. Any differences in ideology are identified in the text of this thesis as required.   
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the Islamic State, but it also covers recent analysis of the Afghan Taliban, Hezbollah, al-
Shabaab, and Jabhat Fatah al-Sham. 
1. Definition of Terrorism 
Analyzing the evolution of terrorism requires establishing a general definition 
thereof. In the United States, each agency seems to have a slightly different definition 
based on the agency’s mission. The U.S. State Department defines terrorism as 
“premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets 
by subnational groups or clandestine agents.”4 The Department of Defense’s definition is 
similar to the State Department’s. It defines terrorism as “the unlawful use of violence or 
threat of violence, often motivated by religious, political, or other ideological beliefs, to 
instill fear and coerce governments or societies in pursuit of goals that are usually 
political.”5 The definitions from the State Department and the Department of Defense 
include language that implies a focus on terrorism as a threat to the world, rather than to 
the United States. 
The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI’s) definition of terrorism focuses on 
the legality of terrorism as it pertains to the United States: “The unlawful use of force or 
violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian 
population, or any segment thereof in furtherance of political or social objectives.”6 The 
legal focus on the FBI’s definition makes sense as it comes from a domestic law 
enforcement agency. The Department of Homeland Security defines terrorism as a 
criminal act that endangers people, infrastructure, or resources; violates U.S. laws; and 
that is designed to intimidate civilians and influence government policy.7 Like the FBI’s 
definition, this definition focuses on terrorism as an illegal act, though it broadens the 
                                                 
4 “Glossary,” Department of State, accessed September 14, 2016, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/info/
c16718.htm. 
5 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Joint 
Publication 1-02) (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2016), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/
new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf. 
6 “What We Investigate” FBI, accessed March 22, 2016, https://www.fbi.gov/albuquerque/about-us/
what-we-investigate/priorities. 
7 107th Congress, “Homeland Security Act of 2002,” November 25, 2002, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/
default/files/publications/hr_5005_enr.pdf. 
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definition to encompass violence against infrastructure as well as citizens, again catering 
to the mission of the agency. 
Based on a synthesis of these definitions and an analysis of the commonalities, the 
definition of terrorism used herein is as follows: an ideologically motivated use or threat 
of violence by a non-governmental organization against a population with the intention of 
coercing or influencing a government or society. 
2. The Evolution of Terrorism 
There is a constantly growing body of literature, scholarly or otherwise, 
concerning the history and evolution of terrorism. Interestingly, much of the information 
seems to fit into one of two categories: studies that document terrorism from ancient 
times to around 2004 and treatments that analyze terrorism from September 11, 2001, to 
the near-present. Since modern terrorism first emerged in the mid-1900s, it has 
undergone several well-documented evolutionary stages. The first stage included the shift 
from nationalist-centered terrorism to religious terrorism. The next wave saw suicide 
terrorism followed by lone-wolf attacks and decentralized terror organizations in the 
post-9/11 world. Bruce Hoffman provides a general overview of terrorism, its history, 
and much of its evolution beginning in the 1700s.8 His work also includes a history of the 
definition of terrorism, which has been a critical guide to this thesis. Hoffman holds that 
contemporary terrorism began with the fall of the colonial era in the mid-1900s; his work 
covers terrorism until 2006.   
Unlike in the 1960s and ‘70s, when the majority of terrorist groups followed a 
Marxist or nationalist ideology, the last three decades have witnessed a proliferation of 
Islamic jihadist militant groups. Recent evolutionary steps in terrorism include the 
implementation of suicide terrorism, as Robert Pape discusses in depth in his book Dying 
to Win: The Strategic Logic of Terrorism.9 Notably, Pape makes the claim “that suicide 
terrorism is mainly a response to foreign occupation rather than the product of Islamic 
                                                 
8 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006). 
9 Robert Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Random House, 
2005). 
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fundamentalism.”10 On that note, Pape also claims that military action rarely stops such 
groups. This is a crucial point—one that policymakers should not ignore when attempting 
to deal with the groups. From Pape’s perspective, military action is not necessarily the 
best way to counter terrorism. It may be that military action taken against organizations 
with regional control in the Middle East prompts more traditional terrorist attacks in the 
West.  
To more efficiently target Western nations, terrorist organizations have also 
distributed propaganda via technology mediums in an effort to inspire disenfranchised 
individuals to conduct similar attacks. While this innovation is not a new phenomenon, 
its use has greatly increased in recent years. Jeffrey Simon elaborates on this topic and its 
value in Lone Wolf Terrorism: Understanding the Growing Threat. Simon claims that the 
rise in lone-wolf terrorism is directly related to the emergence of a new technological 
wave of terrorism. Specifically, Simon writes that the internet and the availability of 
extremist ideology to anyone from the comfort of home spur lone wolves. The 
availability of internet propaganda coupled with the inherent difficulty in finding these 
solitary actors has increased the popularity of lone-wolf terrorism.11 Pape and Simon 
agree that military action is not necessarily the answer to the problem of terrorism; it only 
causes more attacks to occur. Marc Sageman outlines the reasons for this increase in his 
book Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century. Sageman 
maintains that global hostility toward al-Qaeda has forced the organization to adopt a less 
centralized course, which encourages individuals or small groups to essentially self-
radicalize and further al-Qaeda’s goals individually.12   
After 2001, al-Qaeda turned away from its former model—a centralized 
command structure that would direct operations around the world. In The Mind of the 
Terrorist: The Psychology of Terrorism from the IRA to al-Qaeda, Jerrold Post says that 
al-Qaeda “operated much more autonomously, out of hubs and nodes but absent the prior 
                                                 
10 Ibid. 
11 Jeffrey D. Simon, Lone Wolf Terrorism: Understanding the Growing Threat, 1st edition (Amherst, 
NY: Prometheus Books, 2013). 
12 Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008). 
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centralized hierarchical control.”13 This is interesting in the context of this thesis because 
it seems that many organizations, including Jabhat Fatah al-Sham and the Islamic State, 
have used that autonomy to make themselves more centralized.14 Along those lines, al-
Qaeda was forced to adopt new innovations like lone-wolf terrorism to remain successful 
in the wake of the Global War on Terror. 
In spite of al-Qaeda’s shift toward the encouragement of lone-wolf attacks in the 
West, many organizations have made significant efforts to establish themselves as 
regional powers, going so far as to declare themselves states. Sageman provides 
ideological context for this change in Understanding Terror Networks. This work 
discusses the history and evolution of the global jihadist movement, focusing prominently 
on al-Qaeda and the jihadist fight in Afghanistan. He states, “The Salafi Jihad is a 
revivalist movement advocating the violent overthrow of local Muslim government—the 
‘near enemy’—and establishment of an Islamic state.”15 This is exactly what many Sunni 
extremist organizations are trying to accomplish. Angel Rabasa and Cheryl Benard agree 
with this notion in Eurojihad: Patterns of Islamist Radicalization and Terrorism in 
Europe, stating that a small minority of Muslims are waging jihad as a means to establish 
the Islamic state.16 While the international community has tended to ignore these claims 
of statehood, these organizations should be measured against the international 
community’s definition of statehood to determine how closely modern terrorist 
organizations resemble states.   
 
                                                 
13 Jerrold M. Post, The Mind of the Terrorist: The Psychology of Terrorism from the IRA to al-Qaeda, 
First edition (New York: St. Martin’s, 2007). 
14 Ibid. 
15 Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2011). 
16 Angel Rabasa and Cheryl Benard, Eurojihad: Patterns of Islamist Radicalization and Terrorism in 
Europe (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
 7 
3. Definition of States 
The Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States is a treaty that 
was signed in 1933 in Montevideo, Uruguay and defined statehood for the international 
community. According to Article I, “The state as a person of international law should 
possess the following qualifications: a) a permanent population; b) a defined territory; c) 
government; and d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states.”17 For the 
purposes of this thesis, states are defined by these guidelines. Also, according to the 
Montevideo Convention, statehood is not contingent on recognition from other states. 
While the convention was ratified by the United States, this system of defining statehood 
was also adopted by the European Union. These criteria will be used to determine the 
extent to which Islamist terrorist organizations are becoming more like traditional states. 
Should the behavior of modern Islamist militant organizations ever match this definition 
of statehood, it would have wide implications for homeland security in the West. For 
example, one terrorism case was called into question when a defense attorney made the 
claim that his client could not be tried for terrorism because the Islamic State is not a 
terrorist organization, but a state instead.18 Similar problems will likely emerge in other 
as yet unforeseen areas of homeland security policy. Most terrorist groups do not fulfil all 
of the Montevideo criteria as of 2016; however, they seem to have grown beyond the 
confines of traditional terrorist organizations. It is therefore difficult to define them as 
one or the other. A new definition is required to help policymakers adequately deal with 
hybrid, state-like terrorist organizations.   
C. METHODOLOGY  
The analytical research presented in this section contains two central parts: part 
one focuses on identifying and examining the extent to which Islamist militant 
organizations are beginning to resemble state governments, and part two addresses the 
                                                 
17 “Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States,” Council on Foreign Relations, 
accessed September 14, 2015, http://www.cfr.org/sovereignty/montevideo-convention-rights-duties-states/
p15897. 
18 Abby Simmons, “Lawyers for Minnesota Terror Suspects Argue ISIL Not a Terrorist 
Organization,” Star Tribune, August 8, 2015, http://www.startribune.com/lawyers-for-minnesota-terror-
suspects-argue-isil-not-a-terrorist-organization/321094901/. 
 8 
extent to which this perceived mutation changes the threat these groups pose to the 
United States.  
This research project takes the form of a comparative case study of five groups: 
the Islamic State, Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, al-Shabaab, Hezbollah, and the Afghan Taliban. 
The research provides an understanding of the phenomenon of Islamist terror 
organizations that are evolving into political entities like states and governments. The 
research uses data from scholarly articles and news sources, and publications from the 
militant organizations themselves.19 
The following criteria are used in the analysis chapter to visually demonstrate the 
state-like similarities each group shares. It also demonstrates how closely each individual 
group resembles the internationally recognized definition of a state set forth by the 
Montevideo Convention. To demonstrate this, criteria derived from the Montevideo 
Convention were used to assess the case study’s progression to statehood. Those criteria 
are: 
• The organization’s span of control has defined borders. 
• The region controlled by the organization contains a permanent 
population. 
• The organization acts in a governmental capacity in the region it controls. 
• The organization has the capacity to enter into relations with foreign 
governments. 
• The organization interacts with neighboring militant organizations. 
  
                                                 
19 Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research Design and Methods, forth, 5th edition (Los Angeles: Sage, 
2009). 
 9 
The following set of questions or analytic criteria is used to illustrate potential 
alterations to the threat posed by changes in the case study groups. Each question 
addresses a key aspect of the organization’s world-view, ideology, or international reach. 
• Is the organization apocalyptic? 
• Do the majority of recruits come from the region under the organization’s 
control? 
• Does the organization have a precursor? 
• Is the organization primarily interested in overthrowing an existing 
regime? 
• Does the organization follow the Maoist model of revolution/guerrilla 
warfare? 
• Is the organization primarily political? 
• Has the organization conducted violent operations outside the geographic 
region in which it exists? 
• Does the organization participate in international jihad? 
• Is the organization religiously based? 
• Does sectarianism play a role in the organization? 
To determine if the case studies meet these criteria, data was collected and 
synthesized from books, scholarly and political journals, and publications produced by 
the militant organizations. Each question (or criteria) was answered with a “yes” if the 
case study matched the criterion or a “no” if the case study failed to match the criterion’s 
verbiage.  
D. CHAPTER OUTLINE  
Chapters II–VI provide overviews of each case study for this thesis. Chapter VII 
compares the extent to which each case study organization has evolved into a regional 
power rather than traditional terrorist group. It concludes by addressing the potential 
threat implications of the evolutionary changes in each case study group. 
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II. CASE STUDY: THE ISLAMIC STATE 
Recently, al-Qaeda has been overshadowed by its former affiliate in Iraq, the 
Islamic State. The Islamic State’s resilience, successes in taking regional control, 
excessively brutal tactics, and ability to inspire attacks around the world have granted it 
international notoriety and legitimacy. The Islamic State used its notoriety on June 29th, 
2014, to designate itself a caliphate. When it made this claim, the Islamic State 
essentially identified itself as a national government or state. 
In 2003, a jihadist organization known as Jamaat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (JTJ) 
became active in Iraq under the leadership of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. In 2004, JTJ 
officially joined al-Qaeda and became al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). According to Ahmed 
Hashim, AQI “provided al-Qaeda with a ready-made base from which to strike the 
United States and [Abu Musab al-Zarqawi] with prestige. He was now part of a brand 
name that drew recruits and financial and logistical support.”20 Joining the al-Qaeda 
franchise provided AQI with legitimacy among the radical Islamist population, boosting 
recruitment. Furthermore, al-Qaeda’s robust covert supply network greatly aided AQI in 
the Iraq war.21 Eventually, AQI concerned al-Qaeda’s leadership due to its brutal tactics 
levied against Iraqi civilians—especially the Shiite population. Al-Qaeda eventually sent 
a letter to AQI ordering it to cease attacks on civilians.22  
In 2006, Zarqawi was killed in an airstrike and Abu Ayyub al-Masri was selected 
as the new Iraqi representative of AQI.23 In order to grow the organization, Masri made 
AQI more Iraq-focused to appeal to the local population. The group was subsequently 
rebranded as the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI) and an Iraqi named Abu Umar al-Baghdadi 
                                                 
20 Ahmed S. Hashim, “The Islamic State: From al-Qaeda Affiliate to Caliphate,” Middle East Policy 
21, no. 4 (December 1, 2014): 69–83, doi:10.1111/mepo.12096. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
23 “Mapping Militant Organizations: The Islamic State,” Stanford University, April 24, 2016, 
http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/1. 
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was placed at its head.24 In 2010, Syria fell into a state of civil war and Abu Muhammad 
al-Baghdadi assumed control of the newly branded Islamic State of Iraq.  
The death of Osama bin Laden in 2011 and Ayman al-Zawahiri’s rise to power in 
al-Qaeda ultimately led to the end of the relationship between al-Qaeda and ISI.25 In 
2013, ISI unilaterally announced a merger with its affiliate group in Syria, Jabhat al-
Nusra, and rebranded itself as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS).26 Both Jabhat al-
Nusra and al-Qaeda resisted this move and officially broke relations with ISIS.27 Over 
the next year, ISIS gained significant portions of territory in Syria and on June 29, 2014, 
declared itself an Islamic caliphate under the name the Islamic State.28 Al-Baghdadi 
declared himself caliph and emphasized that all Muslims were duty-bound to pledge 
allegiance to the Islamic State.29  
A. ANALYSIS 
(1) Ideology 
The Islamic State’s ideology is nearly identical to that of its parent organization, 
al-Qaeda. Although al-Qaeda’s primary concern in the short term has been carrying out 
global jihad against the West and non-Sunni Muslims, one of the organization’s core 
tenets is establishing a global Islamic caliphate.  
The Islamic State, however, believes itself to be the newly established caliphate, 
mirroring the one built by the Prophet Muhammad in the seventh century. Abu Bakr al-
Baghdadi is quoted in Dabiq, the Islamic State’s English-language magazine, portraying 
the Islamic State as an Islamic utopia:  
It is a [caliphate] that gathered the Caucasian, Indian, Chinese, [Syrian], 
Iraqi, Yemeni, Egyptian, [North African], American, French, German, and 
                                                 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Hashim, “The Islamic State.” 
27 “Mapping Militant Organizations: The Islamic State,” Stanford. 
28 Hashim, “The Islamic State.” 
29 Graeme Wood, “What ISIS Really Wants,” The Atlantic, March 2015, http://www.theatlantic.com/
features/archive/2015/02/what-isis-really-wants/384980/. 
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Australian. Allah brought their hearts together, and thus, they became 
brothers by His grace, loving each other for the sake of Allah, standing in 
a single trench, defending and guarding each other, and sacrificing 
themselves for one another.30 
When measured against the humanitarian crisis and harsh justice the Islamic State 
imposes, al-Baghdadi’s words seem disingenuous. The Islamic State believes its 
interpretation of Islam is the only correct form and all non-Sunni, non-Islamic beliefs to 
be apostate in nature. The Islamic State deals harshly with all non-Sunni Islamic beliefs 
through public executions via shootings, beheadings, and crucifixions, a far cry from 
bringing “hearts together.” 
What Is a Caliphate?   
The caliphate that the Islamic State wants to establish is deeply rooted in the 
organization’s ideology. Establishing a caliphate is a task also deeply rooted in Sunni 
fundamentalism. Greg Meyer elaborates on the social importance of caliphates: “From 
[the Muslim] perspective, the caliphates represented a golden age of Islam, when 
Muslims had vast political and economic power and were at the cutting edge in many arts 
and sciences. Re-creating the caliphate is the path to restoring that lost glory, in their 
view.”31 Some Muslims consider the current state of Islam as much diminished from its 
former glory under the caliphate. Followers of al-Qaeda’s ideology link the caliphate 
with the reestablishment of Islam as a major power. The last caliphate was the Ottoman 
Empire, which filled that role from approximately 1300 A.D. to 1923. The dissolution of 
the Ottoman caliphate left the Islamic world without a centralized Islamic power until the 
founding of the Islamic State’s caliphate in 2014.  
According to the Islamic State’s ideology, a man must meet certain criteria under 
Islamic law for him to become the leader, or caliph, of a caliphate. According to Graeme 
Wood, the individual must be a Muslim male in good health from the Quraysh tribe, the 
                                                 
30 “Khilafah Declared,” Dabiq, June 2014, http://media.clarionproject.org/files/09-2014/isis-isil-
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Prophet Muhammad’s affiliation, with territory in which he can impose Sharia law.32 
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and the Islamic State were able to fulfill all criteria to establish a 
caliphate, and it had the population and territory to impose Sharia law.    
Apocalyptic Views 
The Islamic State believes that the Koran specifically ties the group to the end 
times. Al-Qaeda in Iraq views itself as an organization destined to lead the world into the 
end times.33 The Islamic State believes that the final battle between the forces of true 
(Sunni) Islam and the infidels of the world will take place in Northern Syria near a town 
called Dabiq. Supporters of the Islamic State have taken strides to bring about this final 
battle between the Islamic State and Rome, which is prophesied in one of the Islamic 
hadith, or narratives. The identity of Rome in this context is a heavily disputed topic as 
the Papal Army was disbanded long ago. One theory holds Istanbul as Rome because it 
was once the capital of the Eastern Roman Empire.34 Another theory maintains that any 
infidel army, including U.S. armed forces, could be Rome.35 The Islamic State uses 
televised beheadings and terrorist attacks in Western countries to force them into direct 
conflict, which leads one to believe the latter theory.36       
(2) Tactics 
The Islamic State’s military strategy includes two primary fronts. The first is 
conventional war in Syria. It has used conventional military methods to capture and hold 
the territory used to build its caliphate. To do this, the group has seized leftover military 
weapons from the Iraq war and has developed conventional tactics, which it employs 
when taking over regions. Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassan explain, “ISIS seized 
millions of dollars’ worth of American and foreign military equipment after it forced 
three Iraqi divisions to flee in June 2014, and it has also seized large stockpiles of 
                                                 






weapons as well as equipment, facilities, and cash from Syria’s regime and rebel 
groups.”37 Many actions like this appear very similar to an invading country during a 
conventional campaign. Weiss and Hassan explain the Islamic State’s counter-insurgency 
tactics: “Once ISIS controls an area, it establishes a semblance of order and shows zero 
tolerance for any rivalry or public display of weapons. It immediately disarms the local 
communities, primarily of heavy weapons.”38 In this way, the Islamic State is able to 
establish control in a newly conquered territory very quickly. Members of the Islamic 
State have also been known to carry out kidnappings of foreign personnel, including 
journalists and aid workers. Islamic State members either ransom the hostages back to 
their countries of origin or publically execute them.39 
The second front in the Islamic State’s war is abroad. Due to the significant 
following the Islamic State enjoys, it has been able to convince foreign supporters—
through propaganda and social media forums—to carry out attacks abroad in their own 
countries. By encouraging these attacks, the Islamic State avoids the difficulties 
associated with inserting operatives into a foreign country. Extremist propaganda 
available on the internet has led citizens around the world to carry out attacks on their 
own in whatever country they reside. The Islamic State then claims responsibility for 
these lone-offender attacks even though its leadership did not explicitly order them. Two 
recent examples were carried out on the Inland Regional Center in San Bernardino, 
California, and at the Pulse nightclub in Orlando, Florida. The Islamic State neither 
ordered these attacks, nor communicated them to the Islamic State before they occurred. 
However, during the commission of both, the perpetrators communicated their allegiance 
to the Islamic State. These Islamic State–inspired terrorist tactics range in impact. Attacks 
on small groups of people, such as the New York Hatchet attack on three police officers 
and the Garland, Texas, attack on one security guard, have relatively low impact. On the 
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38 Ibid. 
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other hand, when Islamic State–inspired individuals carry out attacks on large crowds, 
such as those in Paris, Belgium, and Orlando, the result is greater collateral damage.  
The Islamic State is focused on these attacks abroad because they are an 
unconventional way to strike opposing states that are either too strong or too far out of 
reach to attack logistically. Therefore, while the Islamic State carries out its conventional 
war of occupation, it also carries out an unconventional war in the West.     
(3) Governance 
The Islamic State has proven itself as an effective governing body relative to any 
other government the Syrians have had previously. Unlike the Syrian government, the 
Islamic State learns and adapts from its mistakes. Weiss and Hassan quote a resident of 
the Islamic State, Ghassan al-Juma from Hasaka, as claiming, “The [Assad] regime made 
mistakes and repeated them. … The [Free Syrian Army], too, made mistakes, and nobody 
could stop them. But when ISIS makes mistakes, it does not repeat them. You go and 
complain. If nobody responds to your complaint, you go to the perpetrator’s leader, and 
you always get what you want if you are right.”40 This is in stark contrast to other groups 
like the Free Syrian Army that have been in charge in the past. In this way, the 
organization not only maintains control, it also establishes itself as a legitimate and fair 
government in the eyes of the populace. Its brand of justice is enticing to the local 
population. 
The Islamic State’s interpretation of Sharia law and its form of justice might seem 
inhumane to Westerners, but to people living under the Assad regime and other Islamist 
organizations, it is a justice that is exceedingly rare. Weiss and Hassan provide the 
following example: “An uncle … lost hundreds of thousands of Syrian pounds years 
before the uprising, in a fraud scheme by a local businessman. When ISIS controlled the 
city of Abu Kamal, the fraudulent man was arrested and forced by ISIS to return all 
money taken unlawfully.”41 In addition, the Islamic State treats its fighters with the same 
fairness that it treats the local population. According to Weiss and Hassan, “ISIS 
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provided safety and security; its methods of justice were swift, and nobody was exempt 
from punishment, including its own fighters who deviated from the strict moral code it 
had laid down. Consequently, kidnappings, robberies, and acts of extortion all but 
disappeared.”42 This justice system, while harsh, proved to be an effective measure in 
keeping the peace and making the public feel safe. 
Finally, the Islamic State provides services for the population it controls. 
Members are not all appointed to military roles, as governance employs a large 
percentage of the population in order to provide services such as security, medical care, 
food, and a justice system.43 In addition, it manages economic control in its attempt to 
legitimize and strengthen its governance in Syria and Iraq.44 
(4) Permanent Population 
The Islamic State has asserted its control over the population living within its 
unofficial borders. Yuval Shany, Amichal Cohen, and Tal Mimran elaborate on the 
Islamic State’s population:  
The requirement of a permanent population stems from the fact that a 
State is a means of realizing the shared aspirations of groups that have 
united due to cultural, religious, historical or other characteristics they 
have in common. There is no threshold of a minimum number of nationals 
necessary for a State. All that is necessary is a permanent population that 
identifies itself as citizens of the nation that makes up the State. This 
requirement is fulfilled when the population ties its fate to the place in 
which the entity has been established and exercises its power of 
governance.45  
Most of the Islamic State’s population continues to live within its borders because it is 
their generational homeland. Arguably, the local residents do not count as a permanent 
population because they are not necessarily willing subjects. On the other hand, the 
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thousands of foreign fighters who have moved to the Islamic State’s territory could fit 
this qualification under the Montevideo Convention because they identify themselves as 
citizens of the Islamic State.46 
(5) Recruitment 
Syrians account for the largest percentage of membership in the Islamic State; 
however, the Islamic State also has an impressively robust foreign recruitment strategy. 
Although an official count does not exist, according to the Soufan Group, nearly 30,000 
foreign fighters have travelled to Syria and Iraq to fight for their various militant 
groups.47 The Islamic State has developed a successful strategy for appealing to the 
youth through social media outlets. By playing on many youths’ inherent insecurities and 
their need to belong, the Islamic State has convinced many teens, both male and female, 
to depart for Syria. Islamic State recruiters have successfully targeted young Americans 
on the internet because their message speaks to the youth’s disenfranchisement and angst. 
Additionally, Islamic State recruiters deliver a promise that youths can make an impact 
on the world.48      
(6) Borders 
The Islamic State controls territory in both Syria and Iraq; however, the borders 
are constantly changing. Times of growth are due to conquest by the Islamic State. 
Meanwhile, operations carried out by opposition and foreign military groups have led to 
an overall decline in the territory held by the Islamic State.49 While the Islamic State still 
controls an expansive amount of territory, it does not have specifically defined borders as 
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of 2016. The Islamic State’s plan for the future (seen in Figure 1) includes expansion 
throughout the Middle East, Northern Africa, and parts of Europe.50 
 
Figure 1.  The Islamic State’s Five-Year Expansion Plan51 
(7) Foreign Relations 
The Islamic State does not generally engage diplomatically with other nations. 
The Islamic State’s international dealings are focused on recruiting, fundraising, and 
carrying out terrorist attacks. However, in 2015, U.S. Treasury representative Adam 
Szubin alleged that the Islamic State has been selling oil to both Turkey and the Assad 
Regime in Syria.52 The Islamic State may be making as much as $40 million per month 
in oil sales.53 While the Assad regime is also located in Syria, this could constitute 
                                                 
50 Mark Aitken, “ISIS Unveils Chilling New Map of Europe as it Plans for World Domination by 
2020,” Mirror, August 9, 2015, http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world-news/isis-unveils-chilling-new-map-
6224227. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Vishakha Sowane, “ISIS Sells Oil to Syria’s Assad Regime, Some to Turkey, U.S. Official Says,” 




foreign relations should the caliphate meet the other criteria in the Montevideo 
Convention. Alternatively, both Szubin and the Russian government allege that the 
Islamic State is selling oil to Turkey. If this is proven, it fulfills the criterion in the 
Montevideo Convention that states have an ability to conduct foreign relations. Turkey 
could be providing legitimacy to the Islamic State’s caliphate.   
Aside from the Syrian government and Turkey, most nations disavow the Islamic 
State. It is unlikely that any nation will ever recognize the Islamic State, even if it does 
manage to fulfill all the requirements of the Montevideo Convention.  
(8) Relations with Other Militant Organizations 
The Islamic State is embroiled in mixed inter-organizational relations. The 
Islamic State and Jabhat Fatah al-Sham have been at odds with each other since 2013 
because Jabhat Fatah al-Sham has refused to pledge itself to the Islamic State. Since then, 
the two groups have clashed violently and frequently. Other Islamist organizations are 
also viewed with animosity by the Islamic State. Many claim the Islamic State’s methods 
are too harsh and violent. The Islamic State’s ideology is not set up to allow for any view 
of Islam other than its own, and considers all other sects of Islam as abominations. This 
leaves no room for ideologically different militant groups in Syria and Iraq. 
Groups like the Free Syrian Army also have a complex and difficult relationship 
with the Islamic State. Though they work together from time to time when it is tactically 
beneficial to the Islamic State, the group’s ideology will not allow another group to 
establish a secular government in Syria. Stanford University provides this example: In 
September 2014, “ISIS and the Free Syrian Army signed a truce; they both agreed to the 
release of around 100 prisoners and that a border issue between Syria and Turkey be 
submitted to an Islamic court.”54 In short, the Islamic State is willing to get along with 
local, likeminded militant groups. This is necessary if it is to hold control over the 
territory it has gained. 
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The Islamic State also has varied relations with other transnational organizations. 
By coming onto the international scene, the Islamic State has attracted several other 
Islamist organizations. It quickly overshadowed al-Qaeda in the perception of other 
likeminded groups as the most powerful Islamist organization in the world. This has 
caused rifts in al-Qaeda-affiliated organizations. Many organizations have experienced 
internal strife wherein members want to place the organization under the control of the 
Islamic State, but leadership does not want to break its allegiance to al-Qaeda. An 
example of this, according to Stanford University, occurred within al-Qaeda in the 
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) when AQAP initially “announced support for ISIS and 
offered advice to the group in a statement made on its website in August 2014. In 
November of that year, however, AQAP declared Baghdadi’s caliphate illegitimate and 
refuted him after he claimed that Yemen was a part of his Islamic State, although it is 
likely that not all AQAP members support the decision to stand against ISIS.”55 
Additionally, the Islamic State has caused rifts in the membership of al-Shabaab, al-
Qaeda’s Somali affiliate, wherein a significant number of the membership was in favor of 
leaving al-Qaeda and declaring allegiance to the Islamic State. This caused conflict 
within the organization, as most members wanted to remain loyal to al-Qaeda. 
B. CASE STUDY RESULTS 
Table 1 contains the results of the Islamic State case study regarding both 
statehood and the organization’s will and capacity to affect U.S. homeland security. The 
statements in Table 1 are used in the analysis chapter to indicate the extent to which the 
Islamist militant organization has evolved from the traditional model of a terrorist group 
into an entity that resembles a state government. To measure this, the statements in 
Table 1 were derived from the guidelines set forth in the Montevideo Convention, which 
is the internationally recognized policy for statehood. Follow-up questions are also 
provided in the table to measure potential alterations to the current threat environment. In 
Chapter VII, the answers to the questions are synthesized with the answers from the other 
case studies. The answers in Table 1 are derived from the information within this chapter. 
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Table 1.   Islamic State Case Study Results 
 
The four Montevideo Convention criteria for statehood appear at the top of the list. The indicators of 




In conclusion, the Islamic State is likely to remain the most significant threat to 
U.S. and Western national security into the future. Through its brutal tactics and hostile 
takeovers of regions in both Syria and Iraq, it has retained substantial amounts of 
territory. Its encouragement of homegrown violent extremists abroad has provided it a 
means to forcefully influence policy in Western nations.  
While the Islamic State does not yet have fully defined borders, the organization 
does control a significant amount of territory in Syria and Iraq. The Islamic State also 
continues to govern a permanent population who has come to the Islamic State willingly 
as well as those Syrian and Iraqi residents who happen to live within the group’s 
territorial borders. Finally, while its tactics are exceedingly brutal, the Islamic State has 
established itself as a governing body over a significant population. Its version of Sharia 
law may be brutal, but it is also fairer, from a certain point of view, than the governance 
of the Assad regime. According to the Montevideo Convention, the case could be made 
that the Islamic State is extremely close to fulfilling all the requirements of statehood in 
the region it governs.  
The Islamic State has made the establishment of a legitimate caliphate in the 
Middle East a primary objective for the group, and all of its actions have been done to 
further that goal.       
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III. CASE STUDY: JABHAT FATAH AL-SHAM 
(JABHAT AL-NUSRA) 
Al-Qaeda’s primary concern is furthering its global jihad against non-Wahhabi 
Muslims, other religions, and non-believers; however, one of its ideological tenets hinges 
on the establishment of a global Islamist caliphate. Al-Qaeda has not made a formal 
attempt to establish itself in any part of the world, but Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, a former al-
Qaeda affiliate, has taken advantage of the Syrian civil war to garner support for an 
Islamic emirate in the name of al-Qaeda. 
Jabhat Fatah al-Sham was initially known as Jabhat al-Nusra and was created by 
the al-Qaeda franchise when Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the head of al-Qaeda in Iraq, began 
to organize jihadist militant groups in Syria. Jabhat al-Nusra garnered support from local 
militant groups and was able to establish itself as a well-supplied organization with the 
help of al-Qaeda in Iraq.56 Although al-Qaeda in Iraq became known for its brutal tactics 
and administration of justice, Jabhat al-Nusra took a more moderate governance 
approach. While The Islamic State regularly posts videos of its members beheading 
various members of other religions, foreign nationals, and others, Jabhat al-Nusra avoids 
those tactics.57 
In 2013, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declared a merger of the Islamic State in Iraq and 
Jabhat al-Nusra He then rebranded the organization the Islamic State of Iraq and the 
Levant (ISIL). However, Jabhat al-Nusra officially severed its partnership with ISIL 
because the group neither wanted nor agreed to the merger. After that, Jabhat al-Nusra 
reaffirmed its allegiance to al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. Since then, Jabhat al-
Nusra evolved into an autonomous organization, conducting its own operations against 
the Syrian government and rival factions within Syria, including the Islamic State. It is 
attempting to establish itself as a governing body and an alternative to the Syrian 
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government. In July 2016, Jabhat al-Nusra cut ties with al-Qaeda to better unite Syria’s 
militant groups and to stop U.S. and Russian airstrikes against the group. As of August 
2016, Jabhat al-Nusra is known as Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (JFS). JFS’s split from al-Qaeda 
has not caused a change in its ideology or objectives, which are outlined in this chapter. 
A. ANALYSIS 
(1) Ideology 
Jabhat Fatah al-Sham’s ideology is closely tied to al-Qaeda’s.58 In 2005, Abu 
Bakr Naji outlined al Qaeda’s strategy and its rationale for the establishment of a global 
Islamic caliphate in a manifesto entitled “The Management of Savagery: The Most 
Critical Stage through Which the Umma Will Pass.”59 The “management of savagery” 
refers to the strategy for exploiting the breakdown of order that will happen if a current 
government topples. As described in a post by Mark Tapson on The Counter Jihad 
Report blog, the administration of savagery entails the following: 
• Establishing internal security 
• Providing food and medical treatment 
• Securing the borders against the invasion of enemies 
• Establishing Sharia law 
• Establishing a fighting society at all levels and among all individuals.60 
JFS has made progress in each of the aforementioned areas. It has implemented Sharia 
and established enforcement groups and courts as means to providing security, it has 
made medical supplies and food available to the population, and it has engaged enemies 
to its cause in an effort to secure its territory.   
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JFS is carrying out its war against the Syrian government as a portion of al-
Qaeda’s grander mission of building a global Islamic caliphate.61 JFS’s ideology and 
mission hinges on developing an Islamic emirate, which will become a piece of al-
Qaeda’s global Islamic caliphate. According to its ideology, the establishment of the 
caliphate will bring about a new era in which Islam becomes the world’s religion.62  
Because bringing about a global Islamic caliphate is JFS’s core goal, 
overthrowing the Assad regime in Syria and implementing local governance is a key 
short-term objective. JFS is primarily concerned with dislodging the Assad regime, not 
only because the humanitarian crisis has overwhelmed the area, but also because it will 
be easier to take the seat of governance vacated by the current government. Adhering to 
al-Qaeda’s plan for establishing a global caliphate, it will then declare Syria as the first of 
many Islamic emirates that will one day make up the caliphate. According to Syria 
analyst Jennifer Cafarella, “This Caliphate will reverse what Salafi-Jihadists view as the 
decline of the Muslim community, challenging an ‘anti-Islamic alliance’ of ‘Crusaders,’ 
‘Zionists,’ and ‘apostates.’ Jihadi scholars consider this goal so important that fighting to 
establish this Caliphate becomes a duty incumbent upon every Muslim.”63 JFS takes this 
calling very seriously; however, unlike ISIL, which calls itself the caliphate reborn, JFS 
will not establish a caliphate without consent from other Islamist organizations in the 
region.64 Interestingly, JFS has made claims that they do not care if they act as the 
controlling force in Syria once it becomes an Islamic emirate, just that it becomes one.65  
(2) Tactics 
Early in the Syrian civil war, Jabhat Fatah al-Sham used traditional terrorist 
tactics against Syrian government forces, carrying out suicide bombings and vehicle-
borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) attacks. In order to generate support, meet 
political and military aims, and finance its operations, JFS has been known to stage 
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kidnappings of foreign soldiers in Syria. Cafarella elaborates: “In August 2014, the group 
released a video in collaboration with ISIS that threatened to kill a unit of Lebanese 
soldiers it had taken hostage if Hezbollah did not withdraw from Syria.”66 Since 2012, 
JFS has strengthened its recruitment and evolved to carry out conventional military 
attacks on Assad’s bases and airports and to enforce no-fly zones with anti-aircraft 
weaponry.67 
(3) Governance 
Jabhat Fatah al-Sham has developed an effective hybrid strategy of conquering 
and then implementing social services through existing, likeminded militant 
organizations. The group’s long-term goals of developing an Islamic emirate require the 
group to function not only as a military organization but also as a political organization 
should the group hold control of Syria once the Assad regime falls. To that end, Cafarella 
states, “[Jabhat Fatah al-Sham] actively pursues the establishment of Shari’a courts in 
which other rebel groups will participate. [Its] strategy for governance therefore directly 
grows out of its strategy for integration with Syria’s wider opposition: [JFS] uses its 
military prowess to build relationships with rebel groups, capitalize on their local 
connections, intertwine covertly with their existing structures, and translate its social 
programs into local governance.”68 While it has generally been welcomed in the regions 
to which it has expanded, JFS drew some adversity because it immediately began 
implementing Sharia law in the regions it controlled. For the most part, Cafarella 
explains, JFS is generally successful at implementing Sharia.69  
JFS has gained the trust of the population by providing it with basic services.70 
Rana Khalaf elaborates on the provisions JFS provides: “Its work is not limited to legal 
issues, but extends to cover public services like relief work and medical services, and to 
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intervene in the everyday life of citizens.”71 These practices have caused much of the 
permanent population in regions under JFS’s control to rely on the organization. JFS has 
shown the population under its control a level of fairness in matters of justice unseen 
under Assad’s rule. 
While JFS tries to maintain an indirect position of authority over regional powers, 
the group does control key assets, presumably to ensure cooperation in Syria and progress 
toward becoming an Islamic emirate. Stanford University claims that JFS put Aleppo 
bakeries back in business but, in an effort to retain control of the population, managed the 
supply of flour.72 
(4) Recruitment 
Jabhat Fatah al-Sham’s recruitment strategy is very similar to the Islamic State’s. 
Swaths of foreign fighters have come to Syria to join the organization because of an 
effective social media campaign. According to Adam Baczko, Gilles Dorronsoro, and 
Arthur Quesnay, JFS “owes this independence to foreign funding and war-hardened 
fighters who share the same ideology. To preserve its identity, [JFS] tightly controls the 
recruitment of militants. To the authors’ knowledge, it is the only movement that has 
instituted a trial period for its fighters.”73 
(5) Borders 
As part of the campaign to reestablish a caliphate, al-Qaeda’s ideology, which JFS 
follows, calls for securing borders against foreign powers. This likely includes fighting 
any militant group or government currently involved in Syria, which has accepted 
support from the United States or other foreign powers. This also includes combating any 
militant organization supporting the current Syrian government.  
                                                 
71 Rana Khalaf, “Governance without Government in Syria: Civil Society and State Building during 
Conflict,” Syria Studies 7, no. 3 (June 16, 2015): 37–72, https://ojs.st-andrews.ac.uk/index.php/syria/article/
view/1176. 
72 “Mapping Militant Organizations: Jabhat Fatah al-Sham,” Stanford. 
73 Adam Baczko, Gilles Dorronsoro, and Arthur Quesnay, “Building a Syrian State in a Time of Civil 
War,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 16, 2013, http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/
04/16/building-syrian-state-in-time-of-civil-war/fzrk?reloadFlag=1. 
 30 
Because JFS does not directly control areas in Syria, as with the Islamic State, the 
borders of its territory are neither officially nor practically defined. However, the main 
concentration of Syrian towns under JFS control is focused around the northwestern part 
of Syria near Aleppo. The map in Figure 2 shows areas of territorial control of the groups 
fighting in Syria and is accurate as of March 2016. Despite JFS’s control of territories 
and small towns in Syria, it has no defined borders. 
  
Areas under Jabhat Fatah al-Sham control are shown in peach, with red triangles. 
Figure 2.  Territorial Control in Syria as of March 31, 201674 
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(6) Foreign Relations 
Jabhat Fatah al-Sham maintains an aggressive relationship with outside nations. 
Its current primary objective is to overthrow the Syrian government and to establish an 
emirate of its own. As it sees nations like the United States and Russia who do not oppose 
the Syrian government as direct enemies, it targets the armed forces of these nations. The 
group does have one advantage over the Islamic State regarding foreign policy; JFS is 
assumed to pose less of a threat than the Islamic State, allowing it to operate relatively 
unnoticed in is the Islamic State’s shadow. In a CNN article, Cafarella states, “Al-Qaeda, 
meanwhile, has been quietly playing the long game. America’s focus elsewhere has 
played directly into the group’s hands, allowing the group to exploit its time out of the 
spotlight and set up a return to the global stage once ISIS is defeated.”75 The Islamic 
State’s brutal tactics against civilians and foreign nationals makes it the more valuable 
target, taking attention away from JFS and allowing it to operate relatively unobstructed. 
“While ISIS is ruthlessly presiding over the territory it controls, [JFS] is cultivating local 
relationships, building capabilities it intends to use against the U.S. in the future.”76 
Should it be successful in toppling the Assad regime in Syria, JFS will be required to 
open communication with other nations to develop its economy. That said, because the 
group is linked with al-Qaeda and radical Islam, it is unlikely that a nation under the 
control of Jabhat Fatah al-Sham will ever be recognized as a nation-state.    
(7) Relations with Other Militant Organizations 
Jabhat Fatah al-Sham has mixed relations with the other Syrian militant 
organizations. Typically, the group is aggressive toward any organization that backs the 
Assad regime in Syria, but it remains friendly toward most Islamist organizations. The 
Mapping Militant Organizations project at Stanford University claims that “Like most 
militant organizations in the Syrian conflict, [JFS’s] relationships with other groups are 
                                                 




complex and constantly change on the ground. It typically maintains strong relationships 
with Islamist groups that are not ISIS.”77 
JFS does not have good relations with Lebanese Hezbollah. Hezbollah is pursuing 
a policy of support for the government in Syria because of its long-standing alliance with 
the Assad regime. Hezbollah and the Assad regime are part of the Axis of Resistance, an 
organization led by Iran and made up of Middle-Eastern nations and organizations to 
resist Western influence. The Assad regime in Syria has proven itself a strong ally of 
Hezbollah in providing financial support, weapons, and safe haven for Hezbollah to 
establish training camps. Additionally, the proliferation of Sunni extremist groups is 
cause for concern among the Lebanese Shiite population. For these reasons, it is in 
Hezbollah’s best interests to keep the Assad regime in power, which places the 
organization at odds with JFS.78 
B. CASE STUDY RESULTS  
Table 2 contains the questions that were answered in the case study. These 
questions are used in the analysis chapter to indicate the extent to which Jabhat Fatah al-
Sham has evolved from the traditional model of a terrorist group into an entity that 
resembles a state government. To measure this, the statements in Table 2 were derived 
from the guidelines set forth in the Montevideo Convention. Follow-up questions have 
also been provided to measure potential changes to the current threat environment. As 
mentioned previously, Chapter VII synthesizes the following answers with answers from 
the other case studies.     
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Table 2.   Jabhat Fatah al-Sham Case Study Results 
 
The four Montevideo Convention criteria for statehood appear at the top of the list. The indicators of 




In sum, the Jabhat Fatah al-Sham case study reveals the driving force behind 
radical Islamist groups’ move toward statehood. Its devotion to al-Qaeda’s ideology 
propels its primary objective of establishing an emirate under al-Qaeda’s caliphate. While 
the group does not currently have specific borders or relations with outside nations, its 
devotion to courting local militias and success implementing a legal system based on 
Sharia law, as well as JFS’s dedication to community service projects, has won favor 
from local militia groups and the local population in the areas it controls. That it has a 
governance structure and a permanent populace under its direct control are significant 
steps toward statehood, according to the Montevideo Convention. JFS could become a 
significant threat to the West in the future should it succeed in gaining control over Syria. 
It would be unwise to ignore JFS in the face of the threat posed by the Islamic State.        
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IV. CASE STUDY: AL-SHABAAB 
The Somali terrorist group Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahidin, more commonly 
known as al-Shabaab, or the youth, originated as the militant arm of the Islamic Courts 
Union (ICU). The ICU was a Sunni fundamentalist organization whose main ideological 
goal was to establish control of Somalia and implement a rigid interpretation of Sharia 
law. Al-Shabaab had its actual beginnings before joining forces with the ICU; Holly Yan 
elaborates: “Al-Shabaab’s predecessor was al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI), which worked to 
create an Islamist emirate in Somalia. It was partially funded by former al-Qaeda leader 
Osama bin Laden.”79 The organization only achieved prominence, however, after it 
joined the ICU. 
In 1991, the overthrow of a dictatorship under President Siad Barre propelled 
Somalia into a state of anarchy that lasted until 2004, when the international community 
installed a new Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in an effort to bring the region 
under control.80 The government was an abomination to radical Islamist groups due to its 
secular nature and support from foreign nations. 
Al-Shabaab maintained its position as the militant arm of the ICU from 
approximately 1997 to 2006, carrying out attacks on the TFG and international workers 
in Somalia. In mid-2006, the ICU was able to temporarily establish control in Somalia 
before Ethiopian troops invaded the country, threw out the ICU from power, and 
reinstalled the West-friendly TFG. Al-Shabaab was able to retain its organizational 
structure after the Ethiopian invasion and in spite of ICU members’ efforts to reunite the 
shattered organization. Al-Shabaab continued to pursue its own agenda of revenge 
against Ethiopia by dealing destabilizing blows to the TFG. Al-Shabaab’s scorn had its 
roots in the fact that the ICU did not have a global agenda.81 
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In 2008, as al-Shabaab’s relationship with al-Qaeda began to grow, its ideology 
and tactics also grew more similar to al-Qaeda’s. It was through this relationship that al-
Shabaab was able to gain notoriety and begin to attract foreign fighters to the region to 
join its cause. In 2012, al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda officially joined forces.82 Since then, al-




Al-Shabaab began with an ideological desire to bring Somalia under Sharia law as 
part of the ICU. However, in the years after the two groups split, the organization’s 
ideology became less nationalist and more aligned with al-Qaeda. Al-Shabaab has taken 
extreme actions in the pursuit of its form of justice, carrying out punishments such as 
cutting off the hands of thieves and stoning adulterers.83 Today, al-Shabaab is still 
ideologically driven to establish Somalia under Sharia law, but it also wants to build an 
Islamic emirate like Jabhat Fatah al-Sham does in Syria. Al-Shabaab’s Islamic Emirate 
will later become part of a global Islamic caliphate that will be built by al-Qaeda once the 
governments of their enemies fall under the might of al-Qaeda’s jihad. What was once a 
semi-religious nationalist movement primarily concerned with establishing Sharia law in 
Somalia now increasingly mirrors the global struggle against non-Sunni infidels.   
(2) Tactics 
Over the last few years, al-Shabaab has developed from a semi-conventional 
military force waging conventional war against the TFG and its neighbors to an 
asymmetric, decentralized organization.84 Al-Shabaab has been known to undertake 
bombings, assassinations, kidnappings and suicide attacks against the TFG and foreign 
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support forces within Somalia. The group has claimed responsibility for numerous 
international terrorist attacks throughout the East African region, including the 2010 
bomb blasts in Kampala, Uganda, against World Cup spectators and the 2013 attack on 
the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya, wherein several gunmen killed 67 civilians. Al-
Shabaab was also responsible for the 2015 attacks on a Kenyan university that claimed 
approximately 147 lives. The main targets of its attacks—Kenya, Ethiopia, and Uganda—
have all been involved in direct military action against the group. 
Although al-Shabaab claims the Somali struggle for dominance is part of a greater 
global Islamic jihad, the organization has yet to demonstrate attacks in other continents as 
a priority. Recent losses of territory in Somalia to invading forces from the African Union 
forced al-Shabaab to take to the shadows and resort to asymmetric operations and 
terrorist actions abroad in the surrounding region. 
(3) Borders 
Although al-Shabaab is now operating in a less centralized, more asymmetric 
manner, at its height the group controlled most of southern Somalia, including parts of 
the capital. Military advances on al-Shabaab’s territorial holdings have devastatingly 
reduced the organization’s span of control in Somalia to small pockets of territory (see 
Figure 3).  
 38 
 
Areas under al-Shabaab control are shown in dark gray, with black circles. 
Figure 3.  The Territorial Situation in Somalia as of 201685 
  
                                                 




In its years as a significant power in Somalia, al-Shabaab has exercised its own 
version of governance within the territories it controls. Locally, in Somalia, the 
organization enforces its interpretation of morality. Oscar Mwangi elaborates: “It has 
prohibited various social activities that it considers immoral, such as watching movies, 
watching football, chewing khat, shaving beards, and not dressing in a conservative 
manner.”86 The group has provided social services and carried out justice along the lines 
of Sharia law. According to Mwangi, al-Shabaab has been very successful in its 
community-outreach programs: “Somali communities, especially southern ones, have not 
only welcomed it into their towns, but in some cases give [alms] to aid in the movement’s 
jihad efforts. The community level operations are an essential element in al-Shabaab’s 
strategy to sustain its activities, hence it is always trying to expand its local-community 
infrastructure and support.”87 By offering services to Somali communities, al-Shabaab 
has increased its worth to the residents as a positive alternative to any other group or 
government in the region. Al-Shabaab has built community governments encompassing 
local militias and developed a relatively robust system of governance. 
By providing necessities for the Somali community, al-Shabaab was able to 
generate local community support. Mwangi says, “Al-Shabaab plays a critical role in the 
distribution of food and money to the affected and vulnerable communities in the 
country. It has set up food distribution centers and collects [alms] from the communities 
it governs and thereafter distributes money to those most in need.”88 The provision of 
services also provided for other community needs. Similarly, the provision of services 
requires al-Shabaab to recruit non-military positions to help manage governance.89 Along 
with provisions of food and infrastructure, the creation of jobs has helped bathe al-
Shabaab in a positive light for the local population. 
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For a time, al-Shabaab maintained control over a relatively large population that 
inhabited the regions under its control. Though it has now lost much of its original 
territory, it was effective at maintaining peace and order and was accepted—though in 
many cases probably under duress—as the strongest regional power in Somalia. As of 
2016, al-Shabaab controls very little territory, though it formerly governed most of 
southern Somalia and parts of Mogadishu. The populations under al-Shabaab’s control 
seemed to have accepted the organization’s governance until the African Union forces 
liberated their towns. 
After the reign of President Siad Barre from 1991 to the early 2000s, the people of 
Somalia did not have much holding them together as a community. Abdi Samatar 
elaborates: “After more than a decade of war, Somalis’ only remaining source of moral 
and political alternative to chaos was the population’s staunch adherence to Islam.”90 
This religious loyalty likely plays into the population’s willingness to be ruled by an 
Islamic government. 
(6) Recruitment 
Al-Shabaab has been successful in its efforts to recruit Somali nationals within its 
span of control, and abroad within the surrounding regions. Most of al-Shabaab’s fighters 
are Somali nationals. Al-Shabaab has also demonstrated a robust recruitment corps using 
social media to attract foreign fighters from English-speaking countries. Al-Shabaab is 
responsible for the first known American suicide bomber in history.91 
Omar Hammami, also known as Abu Mansoor al-Amriki, was an Alabama-born 
male who became radicalized, disappeared, and was found on an English-language 
recruitment message posted to YouTube for al-Shabaab. Since then, Hammami rose in 
the ranks of al-Shabaab and eventually became the leader of al-Shabaab’s English-
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speaking recruitment campaign. In 2013, inner conflict caused Hammami to leave the 
organization; shortly thereafter, al-Shabaab forces reportedly killed him.  
(7) Relations with Other Militant Organizations 
Since its beginning, al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda have maintained a close 
relationship. Fighters from each group are known to train together. Al-Shabaab officially 
pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda in 2012 and has maintained that standing since. 
Al-Shabaab’s relationship with the Islamic State is dubious. The Islamic State has 
reached out to al-Shabaab, calling for it to sever ties with al-Qaeda and join its ranks 
instead. This has caused a rift within al-Shabaab as some members believe that they 
should follow the Islamic State’s call while others disagree, claiming that they should 
continue to exercise their allegiance to al-Qaeda. Connor Gaffey elaborates: “A small 
faction of fighters under an Al-Shabaab commander in the Puntland region, northern 
Somalia, did declare their allegiance to ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi late in 2015, 
but such instances have been limited and the Somali group’s leadership has reportedly 
threatened to kill any potential defectors.”92 In this way, al-Shabaab leadership attempts 
to maintain organizational control and dissuade traitors to its cause.    
Al-Shabaab’s affiliate organizations, al-Hijra in Kenya and Ras Kamboni in 
Somalia, officially announced a merger in 2010. Al-Shabaab also has rival organizations 
within Somalia, such as Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama’a, dedicated to protecting the nation’s 
traditional form of Sufism.93 
(8) Foreign Relations 
While no foreign countries have outwardly supported al-Shabaab, allegations 
have been made that it may be receiving weapons and funding from Eritrea, Djibouti, 
Iran, Syria, Libya, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia.94 Al-Shabaab’s relations with foreign 
organizations are equally tumultuous as its relations with foreign states. The group 
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heavily regulates the actions of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), limiting where 
they can help the population, what aid they can provide, and what they can feed the 
population. Mwangi elaborates on the reasons for this, explaining that 
Al-Shabaab’s efforts to regulate international NGOs aims to achieve two 
objectives: to portray itself as the protector of the people and to assert 
itself as the legitimate and effective authority in the regions that it 
controls. Firstly, Al-Shabaab accuses the United States and international 
donors of using imported food aid to undermine Somali farmers during the 
harvest season. It also warns the Somali people against becoming 
dependent on aid from the infidels.95 
By dissuading the local population from accepting foreign aid, al-Shabaab is able to 
maintain itself as the regional provider. 
B. CASE STUDY RESULTS 
Table 3 contains the results of the Al-Shabaab case study regarding both 
statehood and the organization’s threat to U.S. homeland security. The statements in 
Table 3 are used in Chapter VII to indicate the extent to which the Islamist militant 
organization has evolved from the traditional model of a terrorist group into an entity that 
resembles a state government. 
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Table 3.   Al-Shabaab Case Study Results 
 
The four Montevideo Convention criteria for statehood appear at the top of the list. The indicators of 




In conclusion, while al-Shabaab is not yet defeated and still presents a clear threat 
to the region surrounding the Horn of Africa, it is unlikely that the organization will 
recover from its current state as an uprooted insurgency. It is also unlikely that the group 
will carry out attacks outside eastern Africa, despite having recruited many foreign 
fighters from nations like the United States and European countries. At one time, al-
Shabaab came very close to seizing control of the government of Somalia. It had a 
defined territory, rumors of an ability to deal with other nations, a span of control 
encompassing a permanent population, and ability to exercise governance within the area 
it controlled. 
Al-Shabaab will likely remain a regional threat. The tribalism of Somalia’s 
population will continue to cause the TFG great trouble and could allow for an al-
Shabaab resurgence due to regional instability and Somalia’s inability to effectively 
establish governance independent of United Nations and African Union forces.     
 
 45 
V. CASE STUDY: HEZBOLLAH 
Hezbollah, meaning “Party of God,” is a Shiite militant group located in Lebanon. 
Since its inception in 1985, the group’s primary focus has been bringing an end to the 
nation of Israel and paving the way for an official state of Palestine in the Levant. In 
2015, United States Director of National Intelligence James Clapper omitted Hezbollah 
from the unclassified world-threat review for the first time.96 While Hezbollah still 
presents a possible threat to U.S. interests abroad, it is arguable if the Shiite militant 
organization ever possessed the desire to directly threaten the United States or make its 
cause anything more than a regional issue unique to the Levant.  
Hezbollah has evolved from a terrorist organization into a legitimized political 
party within Lebanon. It functions as part of the national government, providing services 
for the population and advocating on behalf of the local Shiite population. Hezbollah has 
fulfilled nearly all the criteria for statehood under the Montevideo Convention. It takes 
part in governing the country of Lebanon, exerting control over a territory with defined 
borders and a permanent population, and builds relations with foreign nations. 
In the early 1980s, Israel invaded southern Lebanon in an effort to drive out 
Palestinian militant organizations in the region.97 Palestinian militants had used towns in 
southern Lebanon as safe havens to carry out operations against Israel and rival Lebanese 
organizations.98 In response to this occupation, and sparked by Iran’s example during its 
own Shiite revolution, a new militant organization, Hezbollah, formed.99 After World 
War II, the Sunnis were granted control of the country, which left the minority Shia 
population neglected and voiceless.100 Between the 1980s and early 2000s, Hezbollah 
was responsible for many terrorist attacks against Israel and international interests. The 
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group is credited with the first suicide bombing carried out by an Islamist 
organization.101   
While Hezbollah has proven itself a deadly adversary over the years, it has made 
significant efforts to increase its political status within the government of Lebanon. Most 
of the major attacks carried out by Hezbollah ended by the late 1990s; however, 
according to Stanford University, the group maintains itself as a fighting force in the 
region and runs training camps for its members and members of other groups.102 
A. ANALYSIS 
(1) Ideology 
As Hezbollah is the only Shiite militant organization within this study, its 
ideology differs greatly from all the other organizations’. The differences between the 
Sunni and Shiite sides of Islam are vast; importantly, however, the Shias are greatly 
outnumbered by the Sunnis. Nearly all Middle Eastern countries have Sunni-led 
governments.  
Hezbollah’s first manifesto claimed that the terror group’s primary objectives 
were to destroy Israel, combat international influences, and destroy its enemies within 
Lebanon.103 Hezbollah claimed that any incursions into Lebanese affairs by foreign 
entities could be viewed as hostile acts against the Lebanese people.104 In 2009, 
Hezbollah released another, more moderate manifesto that claimed the organization 
would continue to pursue Lebanese control and an end to the nation of Israel.105 
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Hezbollah’s headquarters are in southern Lebanon, and the group has the most 
direct control in this region.106 Though the group acts as a political party in Lebanon, it is 
not in control of the entire country. Although Hezbollah controls territory, it is a stretch 
to say that it can claim the Lebanon’s internationally accepted borders as its own borders. 
From that point of view, Hezbollah does not entirely fit the Montevideo Convention’s 
description. On the other hand, Hezbollah wields great political power, so the border 
argument cannot be ignored. Hezbollah is a functioning part of the government. 
Therefore, the borders of Lebanon, and largely the southern region where Hezbollah 
exercises the greatest control, could be said to fulfill the border criteria set forth by the 
Montevideo Convention.  
(3) Population 
Hezbollah’s population consists of Lebanese citizens who live primarily in the 
southern region of Lebanon. However, because the group acts like a political party and 
takes part in the government, Hezbollah could claim the entire population of Lebanon as 
being under its control. Unlike other Islamist organizations, Hezbollah does not 
discriminate against its subjects based on religion. Hezbollah offers protection to Shia 
and Sunni Muslims alike as well as to Christians and members of other religions.107 
Hezbollah’s resident population is particularly war-torn because its territory is along the 
southern border with Israel. 
(4) Recruitment 
Most of Hezbollah’s recruits come from Lebanon. The indoctrination of potential 
recruits begins at a young age with programs similar to the Boy Scouts of America.108 In 
                                                 





2009, Hezbollah opened its ranks to Sunni and non-Muslim recruits.109 The organization 
employs recruiters to ensure only high-quality citizens enter Hezbollah’s ranks.  
(5) Tactics 
Hezbollah’s tactics have been used as inspiration by many other terrorist 
organizations. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the group used traditional terrorist 
tactics to carry out attacks through airplane hijackings, kidnappings, and bombings. In the 
years since Hezbollah began taking political power in Lebanon, the group has developed 
significantly into a traditional military force.110 This transition from an asymmetric force 
into a conventional military has changed the tactics it uses. In spite of its increasing 
legitimacy, Hezbollah’s military still operates in a mostly asymmetrical capacity, using 
actions such as rocket attacks on Israeli towns.  
(6) Governance 
Hezbollah has been successful at its governance projects in Lebanon since the 
early 1980s. From the beginning, it likely understood that civic matters were more 
important in garnering support from the local population than military efforts against 
Israel. James Love elaborates on Hezbollah’s success in earning local support: 
“Hezbollah’s Social Service Section is integrated into Lebanese society. The Lebanese 
Shi’a view Hezbollah’s services as an essential part of everyday life. Hezbollah has 
gained and continues to maintain contact with the population.”111 Hezbollah’s social 
sector is very robust and has allowed the organization to obtain significant trust from the 
public.  
Hezbollah’s service provision is necessary for the organization to compete with 
aid organizations and the Lebanese government. James Love further elaborates: “In 
Lebanon, sectarian differences are sharply politicized and institutionalized, and virtually 
all political players (as well as religious groups and secular NGOs) offer social welfare in 
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one form or another.”112 These social services appear in the form of education, basic 
utilities, healthcare, education, and basic utilities.113 
Hezbollah is primarily concerned with the defense of the Lebanese Shiite 
population and claims it a victory when Israeli military efforts fail to cause lasting 
damage to Lebanon. Developing a robust civil infrastructure and utilities commission is 
important for recovering as swiftly as possible after Israeli attacks.  
(7) Foreign Relations 
Hezbollah enjoys a greater-than-most ability to deal and negotiate with foreign 
countries. This is primarily because it has found common cause with other Shia nations 
like Iran and Syria. Iran has been a significant ally and financier and has enabled training 
and equipping of Hezbollah fighters. Hezbollah and Iran find common ground in their 
belief in the Shia path of Islam. Additionally, Iran and Hezbollah have a mutual hatred of 
Israel, which is one of the reasons Iran backs Hezbollah so strongly. Similarly, Hezbollah 
has taken sides in the current Syrian conflict, acting as an ally to the regime of Bashar al-
Assad, the official president of the Syrian government. This is much to the detriment of 
organizations vying for the Syrian seat of governance, like the Islamic State and Jabhat 
Fatah al-Sham. 
(8) Relations with Other Militant Organizations 
Hezbollah has developed a robust training program and, according to Stanford 
University, “it has begun training and assisting other terrorist organizations, often acting 
as a facilitator for Iranian sponsorship.”114 Hezbollah does not discriminate in its support 
of other groups—even for Christian militias operating in Lebanon.115 Hezbollah’s 
relations with Sunni militant groups are poor, as expected, because one of Hezbollah’s 
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primary objectives is to protect the Shia population from Sunni persecution. To that end, 
it has been in Hezbollah’s interests to take part in the struggles of other Shia-led nations. 
Due to positive relations with the Assad regime in Syria, Hezbollah has experienced 
heightened animosity from the Islamic State and other Syrian opposition groups like 
Jabhat Fatah al-Sham.116 This animosity is also due to the atrocities committed by the 
Islamic State against the Shia population in Iraq and Syria. Hezbollah and certain 
Palestinian groups like Hamas are civil due to their common enemy, the Israeli 
government. However, the Sunni–Shia split leaves a chasm between some of these 
groups and Hezbollah.   
B. CASE STUDY RESULTS 
Table 4 contains the results of the Hezbollah case study regarding both statehood 
and the organization’s will and capacity to affect U.S. homeland security. The statements 
in Table 4 are used in Chapter VII to indicate the extent to which the Islamist militant 
organization has evolved from the traditional model of a terrorist group into an entity that 
resembles a state government.  
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Table 4.   Hezbollah Case Study Results 
 
The four Montevideo Convention criteria for statehood appear at the top of the list. The indicators of 




In conclusion, Hezbollah has demonstrated a willingness, desire, and ability to 
exercise governance over the population of Lebanon. The argument can be made that the 
organization technically fulfills all criteria for a government set forth by the Montevideo 
Conference. Hezbollah takes part in governing a swath of territory that has defined 
borders and the Lebanese citizens who live there. It provides services to its population in 
the form of education, health, garbage collection, power, and other necessities like 
drinking water and infrastructure repair. Hezbollah has demonstrated an ability to foster 
relationships with other nations. Iran may not be a trusted country as far as the 
international community is concerned; per the convention, however, this could qualify. 
Hezbollah is unlikely to pose a threat to the United States or the West in the future. If it 
has the will to do so in coming years, Hezbollah will likely continue to grow from a 
militant organization to a political party, taking part in the governing body of Lebanon 




VI. CASE STUDY: THE AFGHAN TALIBAN 
The Taliban rose out of the civil war in Afghanistan following the Soviet 
withdrawal.117 The Taliban established prominence as a political organization in 1994 
when it appeared in seminaries preaching Deobandi Islam, a conservative interpretation 
of the religion related to Wahhabism.118 The word Taliban in Pashto, the plural form of 
the word talib, translates as “seekers of knowledge.” The movement spread quickly 
throughout Afghanistan with support partly from the Pakistani Directorate General for 
Inter-Services Intelligence and recruitment from the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islami religious 
party, and expanded out of the Kandahar province and across southern Afghanistan. The 
Taliban has come closest to establishing—and for a time did establish—control of a 
national government. 
In 1996, al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden was exiled from Sudan and eventually 
came to rest in Afghanistan under the protection of Mullah Omar, the leader of the 
Taliban. In exchange for housing, Osama bin Laden provided funds and increased the 
Taliban’s capabilities, which enabled it to seize control of over 90 percent of the country 
by 1998.119 After linking the attacks of September 11, 2001, to al-Qaeda, the United 
States demanded that the Taliban cease providing a safe haven to the group and expel it 
from Afghanistan. Taliban leader Mullah Omar refused the United States’ request 
because protection of other (non-Shia) Muslims is an obligation under the Taliban’s 
Deobandi interpretation of Islam.120 Shortly after 9/11, the United States invaded 
Afghanistan (where al-Qaeda planned the 9/11 operation) in an effort to neutralize the 
Taliban and uproot al-Qaeda.121 While the United States was initially able to supplant the 
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Taliban during the war, the Taliban was never defeated. With the cessation of direct 
military action (and associated “rules of engagement”) and withdrawal of the vast 
majority of U.S. forces from Afghanistan, the Taliban has once again established itself. 
Presently, the Taliban controls more land in Afghanistan than it did in 2001.  
A. ANALYSIS 
(1) Ideology 
The Taliban is a nationalist Islamist organization whose narrative exudes religious 
nationalist and tribalist undertones. These undertones formed the driving platform behind 
Taliban operations in Afghanistan in the post-occupation years.122 The Taliban adheres to 
the Deobandi interpretation of Islam, and all narratives in the group’s ideology are 
fundamentally inseparable from this fact.  
According to Thomas H. Johnson and Chris Mason, Deobandi Islam is a 
conservative interpretation whose followers seek “to emulate the life and times of the 
Prophet Mohammed.”123 From a Deobandi perspective, adhering to social classes in 
Islam is wrong, meaning that loyalty to Islam always comes first before loyalty to a 
nation. Johnson and Mason elaborate:  
The Deobandi interpretation holds that a Muslim’s primary obligation and 
loyalty is to his religion. The Deobandis oppose any kind of social caste 
system within Islam, to include, naturally, any monarchy. Loyalty to 
country is always secondary. Deobandis also believe they have a sacred 
right and obligation to wage jihad to protect the Muslims of any 
country.124  
The Taliban’s jihad and military themes are related to these religious tenets and include a 
narrative that allows for the Taliban’s struggle against occupation and oppression as a 
legitimate Islamic jihad. Jihad and fighting against foreign influence is more than 
compulsory; it is a religious duty for all Afghans. The military and jihad themes are 
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understandingly attractive to a culture that has developed through insurgency. Afghans, 
in the form of the mujahideen, not only successfully resisted military forces of the Soviet 
Union in the 1980s, but also carried out an insurgency against the United States after the 
U.S. invasion in 2001 that was greatly successful. 
The Taliban makes the nationalist claim that it is the rightful resistance to foreign 
occupation. It claims the Afghan government that “formally” took control in 2004 is a 
physical representation of foreign occupation and American interests.125 Therefore, the 
Taliban declares anyone involved in the current government of Afghanistan an apostate 
and puppet to foreign powers.  
Nationalism meets religion in the last tier of the Taliban’s ideological drivers, 
which demands the creation of an Islamic emirate. All orders and movements undertaken 
by the Taliban, are “claimed” under the authority of Islam. This authority grants the 
Taliban the right to govern the behavior of Muslims.126 With these foundational beliefs, 
the Taliban rules over the territory it controls with the assurance that it is doing Allah’s 
will and that the U.S.-backed Afghan government is a foreign abomination. 
(2) Tactics 
The Taliban primarily conducts asymmetric attacks akin to Maoist guerrilla 
tactics to achieve its ends. Gilles Dorronsoro articulates the changes in Taliban warfare: 
“Since 2006, the Taliban have been using field radios and cell phones to coordinate 
groups of fighters. They are able to coordinate complex attacks, are mobile, and are 
improving their use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs).”127 Taliban attacks often 
take the form of assassinations and targeted IED attacks. Other forms include rocket-
propelled grenades (RPGs), shootings, sniping, and guerrilla tactics. Over the last few 
years, the Taliban has also begun targeting civilians with its guerrilla tactics. Johnson 
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makes the claim that the Taliban has also focused on media-driven attacks, including use 
of larger IEDs, turban-borne IEDs, and an increase in female suicide bombers.128     
The Taliban frequently uses taranas, or chants, to spread propaganda through 
cultural identifiers.129 According to Thomas H. Johnson and Ahmad Waheed, “The 
chants are communicated in the local language and traditional style and often represent a 
manipulation of Afghan traditions, narratives, collective memory of events and culture to 
serve Taliban interests.”130 The messages conveyed by these chants are meant to garner 
support from the population and instill a sense of obedience. According to Johnson and 
Waheed, chants include the following themes: 
• Taliban victory in the cosmic conflict is inevitable. 
• Islam cannot be defeated. 
• The Taliban are national heroes and willing to sacrifice all for Allah and 
country. 
• Afghans have a long and honorable history of defeating invading foreign 
infidels. 
• Foreign invaders as well as their Afghan puppets are attempting to destroy 
Afghan religion and traditions. 
• All Afghans have an obligation to join the jihad against the foreigners and 
apostates.131 
Spreading these chants has been a very successful strategy, as have other Taliban 
propaganda and narratives.132 The United States and the Afghan government have not 
taken these chants seriously and, as a result, the Taliban continues to spread the 
propaganda unprotested. Similarly, the Taliban is also known to use leaflets of 
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propaganda to gain the trust and belief of the Afghan population. These letters have many 
different purposes, from garnering support to issuing threats to those affiliated with the 
Afghan government. These leaflets are called “night letters” because they are often 
delivered at night as a threat.133 
(3) Borders 
Before the United States invaded Afghanistan, the Taliban’s span of control 
encompassed the entire country of Afghanistan (see Figure 4). The nation has officially 
designated borders, which are for the most part recognized among the international 
community. The Durand Line is the Afghan–Pakistani border and dissects traditional 
Pashtun tribal lands. This border is very porous, and Pakistan has made efforts to 
encourage Islamist ideology on the Afghan side of the border in an effort to strengthen its 
position with regards to Pakistan–India issues. Despite the Taliban’s span of control no 
longer encompassing the nation, before 9/11 this terrorist/jihadi group fit the criteria 
under the Montevideo Convention as a nation with defined borders. 




Figure 4.  Map of Taliban-Controlled Afghan Territory in April 2016134 
(4) Population 
The population under Taliban control is made up of Afghan civilians. Unlike 
many other groups examined in this thesis, the Taliban is not known for its recruitment of 
foreigners (this is not to suggest, however, that foreigners have not joined the Taliban). 
While the Taliban is mostly made up of Pashtun Afghans, the group’s scope of control is 
not limited to Pashtun civilians. In the years after the reinstatement of the Karzai 
government, the Taliban has pursued an information campaign against the government to 
dissuade potential collaborators. Johnson and Mason discuss the methods used: “The 
simple message they deliver in person or by ‘night letter’ is one of intimidation: ‘The 
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Americans may stay for five years, they may stay for ten, but eventually they will leave, 
and when they do, we will come back to this village and kill every family that has 
collaborated with the Americans or the Karzai government.’”135 In this way, the Taliban 
sows fear in potential adversaries both by the message and method of delivery. Also of 
note, the Taliban does not consider the Shia legitimate Muslims. The organization has 
carried out many costly massacres against Shia Muslims over the years.136 
(5) Recruitment 
The Afghan Taliban primarily recruits from the populations within its span of 
control and Pakistan’s border region. This organization has demonstrated little in the way 
of recruitment of foreign fighters when compared with Islamist organizations whose 
ideologies focus on the establishment of a global Islamist caliphate. Membership within 
the Taliban’s ranks has increased since its fall of governmental control over large swaths 
of Afghanistan. Estimates indicate that the Taliban grew from 25,000 to 60,000 between 
2009 and 2014.137 According to Johnson and Mason, the group “has a virtually infinite 
number of guerilla recruits pouring out of Deobandi madrassas and growing up in 
Pashtun Afghan refugee camps in northern Pakistan. It could sustain casualties of 10,000 
or more guerillas a year for twenty years without any operational impact.”138 This is not 
indicative of a diminishing organization. Additionally, reports in 2016 indicate that the 
Taliban has begun a targeted recruitment campaign against Afghan children. Human 
Rights Watch explains: “The establishment of training centers in madrasas in the 
Taliban’s expanded zone of control in Kunduz also led to increases in child soldier 
recruitment. Kunduz residents told Human Rights Watch that the Taliban had recruited 
and deployed more than 100 children from Chahardara district alone in 2015.”139 The 
Taliban’s willingness to employ children indicates just how early indoctrination begins. 
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When the United States launched Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001, the 
Taliban enjoyed nearly complete control of Afghanistan—an estimated 90 percent.140 It 
governed and imposed laws, which blended Islamic Sharia law and Taliban 
jurisprudence. Taliban law “was drawn from the Pashtuns’ pre-Islamic tribal code and 
interpretations of Sharia colored by the austere Wahhabi doctrines of the madrassas’ 
Saudi benefactors.”141 This blend likely made the new laws acceptable to the local 
Pashtun population. 
The Afghan Taliban has capitalized on three main issues to garner support for its 
cause from the local population. First, the mistreatment of the Pashtun people who make 
up 40 percent of the population of Afghanistan is a source of major dissent. Second, a 
growing mistrust of the international coalition has been garnered over the last few years; 
according to Dorronsoro, “Graphic pictures on TV of civilian corpses (women, babies) 
killed by the international coalition (IC) have resonated with Afghans who remember the 
Soviet occupation.”142 Finally, the corruption in the Afghan government has driven 
people toward other rulers, including the Taliban. Afghanis have a culture that strives for 
justice and truth. Therefore, the “fairness” offered by Sharia law imposed by the Taliban 
would appear preferable to the corrupt Afghan justice system. While harsh by Western 
standards, Taliban governance has provided a system of justice that is respected by the 
majority of the Afghan population.  
(7) National Relations 
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates provided the Taliban with 
legitimacy by officially recognizing it as the governing body of the nation of 
Afghanistan143 Saudi Arabia provided monetary support to madrassas in an effort to 
spread the message of Wahhabism in the Afghan–Pakistan region, sometimes directly 
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funding the Taliban. Pakistan still provides the Taliban safe haven within its borders in 
order to strengthen its influence in Afghanistan and curtail Indian efforts144  
In 2013, the Taliban installed a diplomatic office in Qatar. The Guardian 
elaborates: “It remains to be seen whether the Taliban just use their office to project the 
image of a government in waiting or whether in the dialogue they pursue a compromise 
with non-Taliban Afghans. Despite the widespread desire for peace, many residents of 
Kabul are for the moment highly skeptical of Taliban intentions.”145 This move may be a 
step toward a peaceful solution in Afghanistan on the part of the Taliban; however, it may 
still be too late to assume that this is the plan.146   
Even the United States opened talks with the Taliban. According to Kenneth 
Katzman, “The Clinton Administration opened talks with the Taliban after it captured 
Qandahar in 1994 and continued to engage the movement after it took power. However, 
the Administration was unable to moderate the Taliban’s policies, and the United States 
withheld recognition of Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan, formally 
recognizing no faction as the government.”147 However, recognition is not part of the 
Montevideo Convention’s criteria for statehood; only the capacity to enter into relations 
with other governments is required. 
(8) Relations with Other Militant Organizations  
Significant effort has been made by the Islamic State to make Afghanistan part of 
its caliphate. It appears to be the Islamic State in Khorasan’s strategy to step into the 
power vacuum left by the Taliban when the United States invaded as quickly as possible 
before the Taliban is able to fully reestablish itself. The Taliban and the Islamic State find 
themselves as rivals in that the Taliban not only remains allied with al-Qaeda but also 
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ideologically rejects foreign powers from intervening in Afghanistan. It has challenged 
the Taliban’s supremacy and therefore strengthened the relationship between the Taliban 
and al-Qaeda.148 
B. CASE STUDY RESULTS 
Table 5 contains the results of the Afghan Taliban case study regarding both 
statehood and the organization’s will and capacity to affect U.S. homeland security. The 
statements in Table 5 are used in Chapter VII to indicate the extent to which the Islamist 
militant organizations have evolved from the traditional model of terrorist groups into 
entities that resemble state governments. The answers in Table 5 are derived from the 
information within this chapter. 
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Table 5.   Afghan Taliban Case Study Results 
 
The four Montevideo Convention criteria for statehood appear at the top of the list. The indicators of 




Of the case study groups in this thesis, the Taliban is the only organization that 
has fulfilled every one of the criteria set forth by the Montevideo Convention to describe 
a functioning state. While the Taliban may not currently meet the entire criteria set, it did 
before the United States invaded Afghanistan in 2001. The reemergence of the Taliban 
and its resurgence show the organization’s resiliency. While it does not share the 
apocalyptic views of the other case study groups in this thesis, an extremist Taliban 
government reemerging in Afghanistan could be destabilizing to the region into the near 
future. The Taliban’s ability to leverage the current government’s shortcomings to 
destabilize it as well as its relationship with al-Qaeda are causes for concern.         
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VII. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
This thesis used a comparative case study to analyze the ways in which five 
Islamist militant organizations have progressed toward statehood. To accomplish this, 
criteria and questions were developed to measure how closely the organizations match 
the internationally recognized definition of a state or government. Other criteria were 
incorporated to provide an analysis of how the evolution of terrorist organizations has 
changed the threat of these groups to the United States. This chapter examines the 
potential implications of Islamist militant organizations becoming more state-like versus 
remaining independent, disconnected cells—the al-Qaeda model—without a centralized 
platform from which they operate. 
The case studies have revealed that most of the terrorist organizations have not 
achieved the full criteria of statehood outlined in the Montevideo Convention. Those 
criteria include the following: 
• The organization must have a permanent population under its control.
• The organization’s territory must have defined borders.
• The organization must be capable of conducting governance.
• The organization must be capable of engaging in relations with other
nations.
This study was undertaken to examine the efforts by Islamist militant organizations to 
establish themselves as regional governments in the Middle East and to indicate any 
change in the threat picture that could occur as a result. Each case study answered a 
predetermined set of questions.  
A. FINDINGS 
The answers to the list of criteria established in Chapter I are presented and 
analyzed in the following sections. In order to adequately compare the results of the case 
studies, an answer of either “yes” or “no” is provided for each criterion by organization. 
The following section analyzes why some organizations are progressing toward either 
statehood or control of a state and how their behaviors are similar. Following the analysis 
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section are implications of the trend of Islamist militant groups becoming national 
political entities similar to states. Results from each of the case studies in the preceding 
chapters are shown in Table 6. 
Table 6.   Comparative Case Study Results 
The four Montevideo Convention criteria for statehood appear at the top of the list. The indicators 
of militant statehood (or progression toward statehood) proposed in this thesis follow. 
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B. ANALYSIS 
Of the five case studies examined in this thesis, the Afghan Taliban is the only 
group that has fully achieved each of the Montevideo Convention’s requirements for 
statehood. Hezbollah has come close to meeting all the requirements, but it would be a 
stretch to say that the group has defined borders since it remains a political party and is 
not the sole governing body of Lebanon. Although the Islamic State, al-Shabaab, and 
Jabhat Fatah al-Sham adhere to the Montevideo criteria of establishing governance and 
having permanent populations, they fall short on the requirements of defined borders and 
the ability to develop relations with other countries. 
Despite so few of the case studies fitting all the requirements of statehood, the 
adherence of militant groups to some of the Montevideo criteria should not be 
discounted. These case studies have implications for the United States and the West 
regardless of whether or not the groups can be classified as full nation-states. It would be 
unwise for the United States and the West to discount progress toward statehood simply 
because these organizations do not yet fit the requirements as defined by the Montevideo 
Convention. It is possible that one day these hybrid terrorist governments will meet the 
rest of the criteria. 
(1) Causes 
There are two primary reasons why Islamist organizations strive for regional 
control: religion and environment. Religion supplies the leadership of these organizations 
with the belief that establishing a state under their form of Islam is a divine mission. This 
is especially true of Wahhabi organizations like the Islamic State, Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, 
and al-Shabaab. While ideology plays a significant role in the process of progressing 
from a terrorist organization to a state, equally important for success are the physical and 
political environments in which the terrorist organizations operate. These groups succeed 
in areas where the government has either already failed or has so neglected its population 
that it may as well be a foreign occupation. 
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(2) Ideology 
In each of the case studies, the evolution of the terrorist group to a government 
entity centers on the organization’s ideology. The Islamic State, Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, 
and to a certain extent al-Shabaab believe that development of a global Islamic caliphate 
that mirrors the one created by the Prophet Muhammad is part of their religious duty. 
Though each of these groups is Sunni, its ideology varies due to cultural difference. The 
Islamic State, for example, believes itself the global caliphate while al-Shabaab and 
Jabhat Fatah al-Sham are building emirates to become part of a global caliphate when it 
is established.   
Nationalism also plays a part in some Islamist groups. The Taliban, al-Shabaab, 
and to an extent Hezbollah have created their own political systems because the 
governments of their claimed territories have failed the citizens by almost any metric of 
government success. Notably, each of these groups has a religious purpose for attempting 
to build a state government. Nationalist-leaning organizations Hezbollah and the Taliban 
are deeply tied to their religions, and reasons for developing a government originate in a 
blend of nationalism and religion. 
(3) Political Systems 
Regional political systems in failed states are a key consideration in examining 
why terrorist groups shift into a governing role. In Syria, Somalia, Afghanistan, and 
Lebanon, the official governments either have failed or do not support the population and 
are considered by many “failed states.” In these cases, terrorist groups with the religious 
or nationalist drive to wield governance have used their resources to win the hearts and 
minds of the local population by providing protection, justice, water, food, and other 
services on a level with which the government cannot compete. In many cases, the 
organizations have been successful, and the populations trust the terrorist organizations 
more than the official governments. 
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(4) Foreign Relations 
While rumors persist that the Islamic State has made deals with the Turkish 
government and with the Assad regime in Syria, only two groups have initiated relations 
with foreign nations. Hezbollah in Lebanon has a longstanding relationship with Iran and 
the Syrian government. The Afghan Taliban entered into relations with as many as six 
foreign nations and had been formally recognized by three before the United States 
occupied the region. Interestingly, the two organizations closest to statehood are the two 
that seem to pose the least threat to the international community. 
(5) Borders 
This thesis makes the case that, of the organizations analyzed, only the Afghan 
Taliban and Hezbollah have come close to having defined borders. The Taliban had 
defined borders because it was the official government of Afghanistan before it was 
supplanted during the U.S. invasion in 2001. Hezbollah, on the other hand, is a political 
party in Lebanon; arguably, the borders of Hezbollah are the defined borders of Lebanon. 
Interestingly, Hezbollah and the Afghan Taliban have both made it clear that protecting 
Afghanistan and Lebanon, respectively, from foreign powers is the primary objective of 
their campaigns. Neither of these groups has participated in global jihad and, therefore, 
has not directly threatened the West. 
C. IMPLICATIONS 
(1) Reclassification 
While only one of these case studies met all Montevideo Convention criteria for 
full statehood, there are significant differences between each of the case studies and 
typical terrorist organizations. The case studies do not fit the model of disassociated 
networks of cells that carry out asymmetric attacks on civilians around the world. 
Therefore, in order for the international community to properly counter these 
organizations, they should be redefined as “militant states.” This is because the 
international community currently runs the risk of treating militant states like the Islamic 
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State the same way it has been treating groups with al-Qaeda’s structure. The West’s 
counter-terrorism tactics may no longer be appropriate for militant states. 
The definition of a militant state comprises four criteria. Militant states are groups 
that 
• establish governance, 
• govern a permanent population, 
• control regional territory, and 
• initiate relations with other militant states.  
This reclassification may help Western leaders customize policies to accurately take 
action against these organizations.       
(2) Apocalyptic Ideology 
Notably, many Islamist militant organizations adhere to a belief system wherein 
Islam will arise out of battle vanquishing all other religions until Islam stands as the 
religion of the entire world. Many Wahhabists believe those who adhere to other religions 
must be killed to fulfil the aforementioned prophesy. This extremist ideology is bad 
enough from a terrorist organization, but a state with that type of ideology is genuine 
cause for concern. Such a nation would likely be willing to use weapons of mass 
destruction on enemy nations. It would take little to provoke that nation into a costly 
confrontation. 
Al-Shabaab and Jabhat Fatah al-Sham hope that, by establishing national control 
over Somalia and Syria, they can create an emirate of a greater Islamic caliphate that will 
one day take over the world. The Islamic State believes that it is the reestablished global 
caliphate. It believes itself the nation to bring about the Mahdi in the fields around the 
village of Dabiq and topple the infidel armies in one final battle. 
This ideology raises serious concerns from a political science standpoint. 
Establishing statehood better equips organizations to reach beyond their borders to strike 
at the West, which these groups blame for the deaths of Muslims throughout the Middle 
East. Their ideology does not allow for tolerance of any other religions. Therefore, even 
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though Jabhat Fatah al-Sham and al-Shabaab do not appear to threaten the West 
currently, if they establish governance in Syria and Somalia, they will likely present a 
threat greater than any other Islamist organization has yet posed. 
(3) Recruitment 
Unlike organizations operating under al-Qaeda’s disassociated network model, 
recruitment efforts among militant states are not limited to recruiting foreign fighters for 
growth of the organization. Those organizations that are still operating under the al-
Qaeda model are by nature comprised of foreign fighters. The advantage to those 
organizations is that they have the ability to go undercover into whatever country best 
suits their needs. It then rests on the heads of Western nations to employ strategies to 
locate the organizations. 
While militant states still employ foreign fighters and go to great lengths to recruit 
them, foreign fighters serve as a tactic rather than as the primary member corps. 
Establishing governance over a region as terror states do affords them the advantage of a 
captive local population from which to recruit. In each case study, even the foreign 
fighter–heavy groups were made up primarily of local citizens. The local population is a 
great advantage to militant states over traditional al-Qaeda networks. 
The recruitment advantage of militant states is bought at a cost to the group. The 
centralized nature of the militant state is also a strategic weakness, as the group is unable 
to disappear from the attention of international coalitions as al-Qaeda has done in the 
past. This leaves the militant state open to airstrikes and other military operations, which 
makes it vulnerable.        
(4) Projection of Power 
Militant states that have taken control of a region or country will be better 
equipped to influence the international community from a centralized seat of power in the 
Middle East. The use of conventional forces against other regional or global powers by 
militant states will likely be more devastating and costly than traditional typical terrorist 
attacks. Without a need to hide their leadership, militant states will become more brazen 
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and forthright with their calls for action, threats, and operations. These states will 
eventually become a homeland for extremists, thereby building nationalist pride on the 
part of the fighters. This will provide them more reason to carry on the global jihad on 
top of their devotion to radical Islam.  
According to the findings, the Islamic State, Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, and al-
Shabaab adhere to ideology similar to al-Qaeda’s, which holds semi-apocalyptic 
aspirations of destroying all other religions aside from Islam. If a militant group with 
ideology like this is allowed to take control of a country, the group may turn its attention 
from internal strife against the now non-existent rival groups and refocus its efforts 
against the neighboring regional powers and the international community.      
(5) Legal Issues 
The evolution of terrorist organizations will cause the West, and particularly the 
United States, problems within the legal system as well. The perceived “statehood” of 
these organizations has already begun to come up in courts. If militant states become 
settled in their regions, more courts will have to consider if the suspect should be charged 
with terrorism or with providing material support to terrorist organizations. This is 
because militant states now barely resemble terrorist organizations. 
In the trial of three Minnesota citizens charged with providing materiel support to 
a terrorist organization, the defense attorneys made the case that their clients could not be 
charged because, “when a terrorist group controls an entire territory, simply being in that 
country would effectively become, under the current charges, support to the terrorist 
group. But when services are provided, it’s no longer possible to describe that territory as 
being part of a terrorist state.”149 The U.S. legal system can expect similar arguments in 
the future as similar organizations become militant states. 
                                                 
149 “Lawyers for Minnesota Jihad Suspects Say Islamic State Not Terror Organization,” Jihad Watch, 
accessed July 1, 2016, https://www.jihadwatch.org/2015/08/lawyers-for-minnesota-jihad-suspects-say-
islamic-state-not-terror-organization. 
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(6) Risks of Military Action 
While the international community should answer the threat posed by militant 
states, taking overt military action against them could prompt an unfavorable outcome. If 
militant states begin to lose territory, the organizations will likely revert to operating like 
traditional terrorist groups. The international community could see an increase of suicide 
and lone-wolf attacks. These attacks will probably happen for two reasons. First, 
asymmetric terrorist attacks are the only way for these groups to hurt superpowers like 
the United States. Second, these organizations need to show their foreign supporters that 
they remain strong and able to fight.  
D. CONCLUSIONS 
Many Islamist militant organizations have begun an evolutionary shift. Many 
have reprioritized their focus into building nations and emirates while still maintaining 
terrorist operations abroad. According to the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and 
Duties of States, in order to be a state, an organization must have a defined population, 
defined borders, an ability to govern, and an ability to enter into relations with other 
nations. All the case study organizations analyzed in this thesis have permanent 
populations and have established governance within the regions they control. Hezbollah 
and the Afghan Taliban also have defined borders to some extent and have the capacity to 
enter into relations with foreign nations. To mitigate the threat posed by these groups, the 
international community must properly identify them. Once that happens, policies to 
counter their efforts that have been customized for the particular threat they pose can be 
undertaken.  
With the exception of the Afghan Taliban, none of the case study organizations in 
this thesis can fully be considered states. Because they have become more than terrorist 
organizations but also do not fit the definition of a state, a third classification should be 
defined. Classifying these hybrid organizations as militant states could enable the 
international community to meet the threat posed by these groups in the future. The 
international community must not continue to ignore the efforts made by these groups 
toward statehood simply because their tactics and form of justice are brutal and 
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unseemly. The apocalyptic views of these groups remain a serious consideration. The 
extent to which they are embedded in their respective regions will continue to provide 
them a base of operations from which to strike at the West and countless potential 
recruits.  
Yet the international community must be cautious; overt military action could 
provoke more traditional terrorist attacks, particularly with the rise of social media as a 
propaganda platform. In order to combat these organizations, the West must understand 
them; in order to understand them, it must listen to them. Islamist militant organizations 
are trying to build and control states. It is unwise to ignore the efforts these groups have 
undertaken simply because they do not yet meet all the criteria for statehood. It is 
unlikely that current policies will remain relevant as militant organizations become more 
than terrorist groups and similar to states.  
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